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PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS
Hugh F. Lynch
Since 6 Augll:ot 1945, when the
United Statcs employed the fir::t atomic
device in warfarc, Presidcnt Truman'8
deeision to employ that weapon has
been both roundly praised and thoroughly condemncd. It has been the
subject of apologia by participants in
the wartimc decision making process; it
has becn elucidated by thc members of
the scientific advisory eommiLLee appointed by Presidcnt I{ooseve\t; and it
has been dcfcnded by thc most prominent statesmcn of the century. 1
Presidcnt Truman in his Memoirs has
unequivocally claimed responsihility for
the decision on the w;c of the bomb in
tllC'sl' words: "Thl' final decision to USI'
tllC' bOIll!. was ul' 10 1111'. 1.1'1 IllC'n' lit' nn
lIIislake ahnut it. "2
Two 1II'I'adl's la(('r an inll-rl'siing hul
somewhat alarming study conll-ndl'd
th:lt the decision to l)Omb II iroshima

and Nagasaki was not rcally I Iurry Truman's. Writing in Political Studies,
D:lI1iel Snowman argued forcefully that
a n~ason:lhh: alkrnalivl~ wall 111~nil:(1 IllIl
COlI\millllt.'r in Chid, th:lt IIHllly lim·
iting deeisions had preceded tlw dl~ath
of Frallklin Roosevelt, that with only
onc execption all of thc President's
adviscrs favored lise of thc Ilt'W weapon
against .I apancsc eitil$, and that the
cirellm:otane($ :1IIc1 gmlls of till: war and
the investment of $2 billion and 3 Y(lan,
of work-including that of some o'f the
most talented scientists in the worldcompelled an affirmative dccision. 3
In implying that Trumun's politiral
life demillllh'd a('ll'lies('('n!'c in :t d('('isinn whil-h W:IS in fad Ilnlsidl' of hill
('nntrol, i\lr. Snnwman I'nslII lali'll :r I'nlllhinalinn of ('ir('ulllstillll'I'S whi..J1 only
Ihl' ('haraeler of a Lil\{loln ('ollid dl'fy.
Bllt the most disquicting e1clllllnt of
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Snowman's monograph is his assertion'
thnt the factors which helped to producc the compliance of 1945 still
prevnil.4
The Unitcd Stntes today continues to
fight its longest war, enduring some of
the most restrictive rules of I'ngagemenl
cver voluntarily endured hy a major
power. In our second major war since
Hiroshima, tIll: leaders of lhl~ Armed
Forccs of the United Stall:s find thal
their political supcriors have done whaJ
General I\JacArthur said could not he
done: instead of ~ekillg complete vil:tory, thl'y have pursucd limited goals. s
Some military leaders IlOW helieve our
Iluclear weapons have heen needlessly
hut tightly shaeklcd, with ~rl'at dl'lrinll'nt to our national inten'i.'ti.'. Promincnt among these men is GI'n. Curtis K
Lemay, former Chief of Staff of the Air
Forcc. 6
Whilc hoth I\Jr. Snowman's contention and thc fl:ars of Gcneral Lemay
may well hc far from the truth of till:
situation today, they point up the need
for investigation of the Presidential
dechlionmaking process regarding the
usc of nueIcar wcapons. Our Chief
Execlltivl: should lIeillwr he so n:strieled by till! lack of f(!asihlc options
on the haLLleficld that he is fon:ed to
abandon the ealltion pn!scrilll'd hy his
own judgmcnt nor so limited by extraneolls factors that he cannot authoril'.e
the IIS(! of nuclear wcapons when Ill:
feels they must he employed.
I t is the purpose of this paper to
examine the Presidential dccisionmaking
process in order to identify those forces
which n'striet the President's freedom
of action on the nuclear question and,
furthcr, to determine whether or not
freedom of choice actually remains with
tl\(: Comlllllllller in Chil'f.
In thii.' d,'('adl' thl' 1'1"III,'nt of dwicI'
for tIll' liN.' or n.lnll:',' of 1IIH'II';lr
'\'l'allllns ,ltws not 1II'nland dO:'I' I"\alllinut ion in thl' ,'ontcxt of ~"n,'r;ll nnclear
wur so mlleh as in the limited or lo,'al
war cnvironn~l:nt, for there hus been

worldwide n:cognition of the irrationality of unrestrieled thermonlldear
hombardment undl'r any ein:umstanees.
I\Jany nuelear strategists and ordinary
eitil'.l:JJs alike dOllbt the wisdom of any
bilateral or multilateral use of /luclenr
weapons. I t is a Gommon fear on both
sirles of the "} ron Curtain" that any
cmploYlnent of tactiealnuc1ear weapons
in Europe will introduce an element of
instahility whieh could rapidly esealnte
to the intercontinental nuclear conflict
equally feared by all. Thus it would
appenr more important to cxamine the
l110re tClllpting dl~eision to employ t;I(:tical nuclcnr weapons in limited wars
outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area.
This is the deeigion whieh the President
of the Unitl:d Statl's will IIlOgt lik,'ly
face in the periodie crises and protracted local wars likely to occur in the
last third of thc 20th century.
Before proceeding further, it would
be useful to define the term "limited
war." A number of reccnt books have
provided excellent definitions of the
"limited war" concept, one of which is
Rohert O~ood'g, published in 1957:

... ra war I in which the helligercn ts restriet the purposes for
which they fight to concrete, wellddilll,d ohjl!etivl$ that do not
demand the utmost effort of
whieh the belligerents are cajJ'1lhle
and that ean he aeeommodated in
n IlI'gotiatl:d sl'LLI,:rrwnl. Generally
speaking, a limited war nctiveiy
involves only two (or very few)
major helligerents in the fighting.
The battle is confined to a local
geo~raphic an:a and
directed
against sclcded targets-primarily
those of direct military imp ortmH'e. It dl'nHIIII}s of the helligI'n'nts only iI frat,tional ,'omlllitllH'nt of their hnlllan a'llll'hysil';11
n'Stlurt'"s, It lH"rmits Ih"ir 1'("0nOlllil', social, and political patll'rns of cx istelll'e to COil tinu,~
without serious disruption. 7
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This dl'finition ad'!({IJat('ly desl:rilH's tlw
eOlll'I'pL of limited war for the purpost:s
of Ihis papt'r.
Tadical nuclear weapons are more
defiant of aCI:IIrate description. Indccd,
it has heen said LhaL iL appears impossihle Lo draw a shnrp line IwLween the
two classes. s This difficulty is notunn:laled to the larger proult'm of esealation
onee nudear wt'apons have het:n inLrodueed to the hauld'it:ld. Neither the
.JoinL Chiefs of Staff nor ~onH: of the
besL authors on lI\1elear warfan' attempt
10 pn'('i:O:I'ly defilw tal'lil'al nnl'lt'ar
weapons. Bernard Brodil: mainLains th;rt
evt'll Llwir t:lIlploymenl dot·s noL d.:arly
disLinguish beLween the Lwo eategories.
He has claimt:d th;rt LIlt: wI:apons
dropped at Hiroshima and Naga:o:aki
wt:re as Illueh LacLieal bOlllus as strategic, '~>,inc(: Lheir yields were of a size
now regarded as falling entirely wiLhin
Lhe tadieal r;rnge."9
Any atLempt aL quantificaLion of the
par;rllleters of tacLical nuclear weapons
can only he a very rough approx ima Lion
ancl may he quickly rendered obsolete
by virtue of anoLher generation of weaponry. Therefore, at LIlt: risk of arbiLrariness and in disagn:emenl wilh Brodi(',
the following funcLional definition hy
l; It,nn II. Snyder will he acct'pl(:d:
" ... tal'li('al nudt:ar weapons an: shorlrunge weapons of relatively low explosive power, deployed on or lIear the
haUldidd art!a, to Ire used for sLriking
at miliLary targels in the eOlllhat urea or
directly behind it.,,1 0
While the above definiLions arc general enough Lo apply to mosL cOlllpetitive siLuaLions beLween a major nuclear
power and the agent or proxy of
another major nuclear power, direct
eonfronLaLions of Lwo major nuclear
powers simply eannot be {'atcgorized in
this nHI\IJl('r. By a proel$S of for1l1al
illliilJl(:1' anti rqlt'alt't1 diplo1l1atil' pro11011ll"('1I1('nt ... IIH' 1I11ilt'ti Stalt's ha,;
definer! our intere:-:t in NATO as "vital."
'\n aLLaek by the Warsaw PacL niltions
upon our European allies would be

rt:~an!t:d almo~t :I~ an allal'k u(lon tlw

United Statl's iL"t'lf. This pfeHenLly
unique ~ituation thus defi(·s thc definitions and eonsiilt'raLions of this paper. A
different Et:L of rules applie~. The ability
of eiLher side to resLrid allY haLLlefronL
ill Ellropt~ to "limited war" or to avoid
rapid esealaLion to general nudear war,
following tlw use of taeLi(':l1 nue!t'ar
wt:np<l\ls is l'l.'riolJsly qlJl!stioned hy ,:vC'n
tlw most oLpimistie stratt'gists. In the
f\lture, con fronta tions wiLh another
I!ro\\ ing nUl'lear for(,c, that of th,'
Pl'()plt~'s Ht'puhlie of China. 1I1ay al:;o
dt'fy the :-:til'ul:ltions of limilt:d wnr. lIul
for now, the one e:\ct'l'tion conLrary to
the "rules" of limited wnr :JIlt I which,
Lherefore, is noL eonsiilen'd within tlw
purvil'w of Lhis paper, is Ihe NATOI
Warsaw Pad eompeLiLion in Europe.
WiLh that :-:ingle exception we will proeeed Lo look aL Lltt: force5 which impinge upon the President in arriving:lL
his deeision on till: usc of nudl:1lr
we:lpons.
Advisers. Consenters and Dissenters.
A Europ('an, ('ol1lmenling Oil nucle:lr
stnlLl'gy and dt:lerrenc(: in N,\TO, 01\('(\
daillll,d IhaL what rt:ally mallt'n:c\ was
not so much to have n finger on II\('
nuclt:ar trigger, huL raLlwr "to partidpalt: fully in Ihe formulalion of idt'as,
I'0liey and ~trategy thaL logt:llwr makl:
lip the doctrine on which tlw decision
o f t h e American Pn:sidell L must
depend. " I I It is this prot:(:ss of the
formulaLion of nuclear doeLrine which
we shaH now examine in order to
determine if the President is a t:aptive of
the political sysLem whieh Iw heads or a
free agent with full power to employ or
not employ nuclear weapons.
Any President's decision on the usc
of nllclear weapons should be (!onr!itioned hy many ye:lrs of eX)lt:rienc(\ in
(;ovl:rnnJt:nl. Ilopt:fnlly, Ihe individual
sl ralt'l!il' It'nst's Ill' wl'ars will hI' I'm"t"
fully grolllltl hy extensiv(! l'llIltacL wilh
Lhe more relevanL Lheories of deterrence
and with an intimate knowledge of the
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game of practical intcrnational politics.
Evcn our more well-prepared Presidents,
however, have usually been bcttcr
trained for the domestic arena through
many years of campaigning and· politicking. Further, there arc practical
limits to anyone man's preparation for
all the decisions referred to a President
for final resolution. The Commander in
Chief must rely to some extent, on the
decisions of his predecessors and the
options prcsentcd by his advisers.
One might plausibly assume that
preeminent am~mg these advisers would
b(~ the Joint Chiefs of Staff mill the
large staffs supporting thcm. However,
this is not true. The most significant
structural evidcnce of the cxisting lac\of apprcciation for the military vicwpoint is the absence of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs from the statutory
membership 'Df the National Security
Council. Although his opinions may b(!
prescntcd p(~rsonally upon invitation to
NSC meetings or through the membership on the NSC of thc Secretary of
Defense, his presence is not required by
law.
One need only examine the recent
lit!'rnturc on Pn~sidl"ntial polities a 1111
foreign affairs to find repeated rcfereIWI!S to Presidentialmistrnst of military
advice on the usc of nuch!ar weaplllls
since 1945. Former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson in recalling the outspoken, public advice from thc Defense
Establishment on employment of the
atomic bomb during the Korean war
wrote:
In August, Secn:tary of the
Navy Francis P. Matthcws in a
Rpe(!ch in Boston called for preventivc war. Hll was made Amba&sailor to I rcland. Then Co enernl
On-iII(' Anderson, Commandant of
tIll' Air War ColIl'!!l', 1Il1nOUI\l'I'"
that tIll' Air Fon'l', l'qUipPl'd mill
ready, only l\Waited orders to
drop its bombs on Moscow. He
was retired. 12

The doubts of anothcr administration in another decade were reflected
in Bobby Kennedy's book on the Cuban
missile crisis published after his own
death. In Thirteen Days, he wrote of
JFK's impressions on the military advice
received:
But he was distressed that the
representatives with whom he
met, with the notable exception
of General Taylor, seemed to give
so lillIe consideration to the implications of the steps tlwy suggeRled .... On tllllt faleful SlIIlIlay
morning when the Russians
answered they were withdrawing
their missiles, it was suggested by
one high military advisor that we
attack Monday in any
case.... President Kennedy was
disturbed by this inability to look
beyond the limited military field.
When we talked about this later
he said we had to remember they
were trained to fight and wage
war-that was their life. Perhaps
we would feci more coneerned if
they were always opposed to
IIsillg anns or mililary Illeans-for
if IIu:y would not he willing, who
would be'? But thiR expcriem!e
Jloinlt:d Oil t for liS all tlll~ illlportance of civilian direction and
control and the importance of
raising probing questions to military recommendations. 1 3
Whilc this last statement demonstratcs the basic skcpticism among political Icadcrs for military solutions, at
thc same time it also reveals a respect
for the duty of the Joint Chiefs to "tell
it like it is," to report the military
siltllliion as mililary men, and after that
for Ihl' politil~al h:aders 10 make the
politil'al dl'l'isiom~ mill sland n'sponsihle
for thl'lll.
On the nuclear issue lIlany conflicting positions have been taken by
high-ranking men in uniform. For every
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one who would recommend the use of
nuclear wcapons in limited war, thcre
has been anothcr like Vice Adm. Charles
E. "Cat" Brown, former Commander,
6th Fleet, who publicly stated: "1 have
no faith in so-call cd controlled usc of
atomic weapons.... I would not rccommend the use of atomic wcapons, no
matter how small, whcn both sides have
thc powcr to destroy thc world. "
Admiral Brown addcd that he did not
bclicve there was any dependable distill(:tion between taetieal, or loeali:r.ed
and restricted targets or situations, mill
strategic or unlimited situations.! 4
It often happens that Presidents will,
in times of crisis, turn for advice not to
the military, but to a group of Americans not always respectfully referred to
as "the intellectuals." Since World War
II the number of people outside the
Military E!;tablishment professionally
engaged in the study of defe:nse policy
has grown from a handful to hundreds. 15 The President of the United
States can now choose among defense
intellcctuals from rcsearch corporations
and l'UIIIIllISPS for allernutive sources of
udviee. The growth of "think tunks,"
such as the Rmul Corporation, the
Institute for Strategic Studies, and the
Hudson Institute, has been more than
matched by the: growth of sc:lf-styled
institutes thut have appeared on tlw
campuses of the finest universities in the
country. These academicians have had a
strong impact on the formulation of
policy in Washington through their
writings and consultative services.
The "McNamara phenomenon"
introduced a group of these intellectuals
called "the whi:r. kids," and it would he
politically naive not to reeogni:r.e! that
this element is here to stay. The military
servic:es should carefully note-as one
professional \V hitt: I\ouse: ohserve:r has
notcd-tllilt tlH! young Ph.D.'s who t:ompose this group have! heen found quill:
useful. They stilI hold key positions in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and the burgeoning staff of the National
Security Council. I 6
It is very important to remember the
influence of such advisers on the formulation of stratcgy and in crisis management. Their background briefings and
policy papers provide the intellectual
blinders through which any Prcsidcnt
will view a crisis.
A I though thcse "defense intellectuals" can be found in any numhcr of
age·neies frolll OSI) (Ofliee' of til(: Seen:tary of Defense:) to nEt> (Offi('(! of
Emergency Preparedness), thos(: who
are closest to the President will have
greatest influence. The "President's
Men" serve a most valuable function.
Their ability to advise the President
without reference to bureaucratic procedures or compctitions will always
cneourage Presidcntial trust in a small
group of able men. From ont: administration to anothcr, their collective name
may change-for example JFK's
"EXCOM" and LBJ's "Tuesday
Luneh "-but their function will remain
till' ~ame. The' e'ompo~ition of thi~ /!fOUP
lIIay be virtually the' ~:une a~ tht'
National See'urity Cmllwil or lIIay include fcw of thosc positions, depcnding
on the style of the Presidcnt. He can use
the: NSC as little or :Hi ,"lI<:h as he
wishes. lIe is solely n:s(lon!iihle for
determining what policy mattcrs will be
handled within its framework.! 7 It is
for this reason that thc President can
and should be held accountable for his
decisions. Though the system he uses
may limit the options or advice that arc
prcsented to him, it is the President
himself who dctcrmines his working
environmcnl. 18 This dominance of the
pe:rsonality of onl: man disturbcd political scientists in thc y(:ars bdore
nudear power lind now gelH'raLc:s (:vcn
more (!oneern. In 1941 Erlwin Corwin
or Princeton ex 1'1"(!g.~ed fear that the
Presidcncy had he:collle dangerously pcrsonali:r.ed in two ways:
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.•. fir!'t, thallhe I,~aden;hip whieh
il affords is dependenl alto~elher
on the aecidenl of personality
a(!:aillsl which our hapha1.ard
nll!thpd of !'clc(:till(!: presidents offers no /!:uarantee; and, sl'colldly,
tlUll there is 110 governmental
body whidl eUI1 III' rdied upon to
~i\',: the Pmsidmlt illllependent advicI! mul whieh Iw is Iu:verthl''''!'s
boulld to eOl1sull. 19
i\lnrl' n:c('ntly, UI'ury Sh'l'le COIII,:xpn::;''i"d his vil:ws on Pro'sidl'ntial power from a diffl:n:nt aspecl:

IlJa~I:r

... the po!'ses.~ion of power ('n- ,
I!OUr:I/.!:I'S mill l:vI'n I:n:all:s eOIlditions whil'h :'1'('ln to n'qllin: ils
usc, alld ... the grl'ater aud more
!:onchl!'!V(: .tIH: power tIll! stron/!:cr
tlw argument\ for its IISC. Tho~l:
who 1;I~sscss authority wanl to
I'xerei~e il: childrell, teacher~,
bos.~es, hureaucrat!', (:ven !'olrlier:;
amI statesnll:n .... Men who possess powl:r think it a shame to I('l
po\\'I'r go to wa:,II' mill "onll,tiIllI'S.
IlI'rhal's lllll'on:wiously, tlw), lIIanIlfal'lllrl' silnalions in "hi('h il
lIlust he u!'ed .... All Ihis wa!'
daug('wus hul not intoler,lhle in
1111: pm-atomic ,lgI~; il is uo IOllgl'r
tolerabk 2 0

,\11 1111: fon:goill(!: mighl suggl:st Ihal
tIll' Pro'!'idl'nt IJa~ ('omplete frl!l'dolll,
afll:r all Ihe adviee is in, to US(: or nol 10
u!'e Ihe nudear wI:apons under his !:OlnlIIarlll. Sui'll a eOll!'lu"ioll would he
I'rrolwous. For as oue l:xperil'IIl:(:d
White House advisl'r has cOlllnwlIlI'd,
"Iill is dl~ar •.. Ihat a Presidl'nl's
aUlhority is lIol as grl'al as his respongibility alld tlUll what is desirahll: is
always lilllill'd by what is possiblt, or
pcrmissihll'. ,,21
II would III' fooli"h for a Pn'"idl'nl 10
il!lIon' IIII' opposilion and limitation" III:
r,\(:('s oulside 1111: I'Xl'('utivc hralldl. Thl'
gn'ah'st ('hl'ck!lII tllI~ Pro'sident's po\\'('r

is lIlt: Congn:s!', Yet it has beeu in the
fidd of foreign affairs amI str.ategymaking when: Congress, at h~a!'t until
the late I 9 (,()'s. !'howed its gn:ate!'l
weaklll'!'s. The fl:w Conl!res~lIlen who
have I,,:.:n c~x I)(~rts in defense policy havc
ad.:d ehil!lly as lohhyists with the exeeulive hrandl. Instead of seeking strength
in Congrf:ss for their poinl of vicw, most
hav(~ used tlH:ir rcsourc(',; Lo get a
hearing with tlw Prcsident. 22
One !'tudy, hy James Hobinson. in
whieh he tabulal!:s foreign jloli,'y and
dl'fl'n!'l: issu($ from Ihe lale 19:1O'" to
IWI I, shows dominanl infhwllce hy
Congress in only one case oul of s(:ven,
tIll! 1954 rleeision nol to intervene with
ilrJIl!'!I forc'l: (sonH: ,;ay ineluding IIII1:h'ilr
wl'apons) .111 I III I01' I'IIna. 23 '1'1 1<11 0111'
decision symholi1.':s for Con!!:f('ss today
a sLate or affairs which it hopes to
achievc in the lwar future.
,\ecording to Chalmcrs Roherts of
the JVa,~hillgton Post, certain congrcs!'ional Icaders were invitcd in j 954 to
the StaLe Department to consider a joint
resolution to be pn:!'ented to Congress
which would III'r1nil Ihe U!'I: of nil' and
naval (l0wl'r in I IlIlnehilln, Two Sl'nnlnrs
m'(' rl'porl!'d 10 hnve asked 1llIl'!'lions of
Ihe briefers. Firsl. SenaLor ClenwnL'i
nsked whether the Chairman of Ihe
Joinl Chids had 11u: .supporl of hi!'
l:olI,:agues mI(l was told thatlHIIII: of tlu:
other I:hids approved. Tlu:n Sellator
Lyndon B. Johnsoll asked wlU:llu:r any
U.S. allies had Iwen eOllsulll~d nnd was
told tlll'y hnd not been. Bolh answers
wen: unsatisfa<:Lory, nnd tl\l: resolu Lion
was IU:VI:r referred to Ihc full Congn:ss
for (!onsideration?4 I t is significant
I'ven in this one eas(~ of effeelivl! congn~ssional persuasion that, of thl' military, Admiral Radford stood alone in
dl'fl:nSl~ of tlw proposed (!oursl: of
adion. and our allies had nol yl~t
eo II I'urrl'c\.
Pnn'n 11H'lil'ally, (; I'n('ral I~ idgway 's
l'Ol\lnwnts on this episode. wriLlen in
19!i(). inl'lude, among otlwr things, this
relevant slatel\lent:
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. . . that same old delusive idea
was advanced-that we could do
things the cheap and easy way, by
going into Indo·China with air and
naval forces alone. To me this had
an ominous ring. For I fell sure
that if we committed air and naval
power to that area, we would have
to follow them immediately with
ground forces in support.
I also knew thal none of those
advocating such a step had any
accurate idea what such an operation would cost in blood and
money and national effort. 2 5

It is also interesting to look b<lck <It
the Cuban missile crisis to find Senators
Richard B. Russell and .I. William Fulbright arguing for!'dully, after being
briefed on·: the <letion contempl<lted by
the administration, that bloekade was
not a strong enough course. 26
Other instances of congrcssion<ll
weakness could be recited, ad nauseum.
The situ<ltion has not changl'd in Vil'lnam. Congress and ('on/!l"essional eOI\1·
mittees have bc(!n singulnrly ineffel!live
in either forcing the administration to
apply "the force that is required" to the
bombing of the North "to sec the job
through," or to require the rapid with·
drawal of our troops by any spe<:ifie
deadline? 7 When the executive branch
makes up its collective and individual
mind to do something in international
affairs, it still appears that Congress is
unable to successfully oppose it.
Uomcstie public opinion docs have
some effect on the decision to usc
nuclear weapons. Although the executive branch, espel:ially during the
Eisenhower years, has on o!'cagion
threatened their use rather subtly without suffering at the polls, the irreparahle
damage incurred when a candid,lte it'
effedively lalH'lecl "nuke-happy" i" :1
h,t't'on whi!'h will nol III' fortrolll'n b\',
prt!t'id('ntial e,lIIt1idateg for ),l'arg to
conle. This polilieal fact of life was

..

recognized -eilrly in the J 9M, campaign .
Said Time magazine: "While Goldwatl:r
vt:llCmently protests thaL he is not nukehappy, il is this rt:pu tation tll(lL is
ruining his chances for e11!ction. Unless
and until he can rid himself o[ the
image, he hasn't a hope of entering the
White House. ,,28 Whether such a campaign prohibition appreciably affects
Presidential decisions once in office is
probably known only hy the officeholders themselves. Certainly there have
been outstanding demonstrations of
political independl'nee by Presidents not
faced with reelection. Harry Truman
faced a strong reaction in his handling
of General l\IaeArthur and his acceptance of limited goals in Korea; Lyndon
Johnson is said 10 have :Wqllil;g(!I'd in a
"proce~s of national illlpl!adnllenL" in
11,~('idin~ not to run for n~('I(,t:tion,29
While pressures from Allleriean puhlic
opinion would not restrain an American
President in a sudden and serious emergeney, certainly they would have some
restrictive effect on the decision for a
first usc of nuclear weapons against a
nonnlldear erwlIIY. slu'h as we hav('
opposed in Korea anti Vidnam,
Tlw words of J erferson's caution to
pay "a decent respect to the opinions of
mankind," still is valid today. Our allies
will certainly in fhwnee any Ile<:ision 10
lise or not USt: nuclear weapons. \V IIrltl
public opinion also will have some
measure of influence 011 the Prcsident.
In late 1950 there occurred u dl!lIlonstratiol1 of close inLeraetion among the
members of the NATO alli:mce upon
the U.S. prosl!eution of the Korean war.
When Harry Truman hinted on :30
Novemher that, if necessary, the atomic
bomb would he l115ed in Korea, notl:vlm
a tadflll "I'larification" in a pn's,,, rl~
II'usI: laLer tIll! ganll: day I!ould lIIurfh!
the reaction in Europe, Two days lall'r
the Prinll' I\liniglers of FraneI' mill Cr('at
Brit:lin !t,ft for \V:I"hingloll 10 I'onllnllni1':111' IllI'ir ('Onl'I'r"n.;J"
I'n't'idl'nt Ei"I'nhnwl'r :IIt'o n'spOIllh,(1
10 British pn'sglln:s on tIll! mall('r of
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Qucmoy alld {\Iatsu in L957. Whcn
artillcry picces capable of firing nuclear
weapons wcre transportcd to Quemoy,
thc mcssagc was not lost on the mainland Chincsc. Thcir shclling of thc island
droppcd off precipitously. 3 1 But thc
mcssagc was also reccivcd in Great
Britain, and Harold Macmillan was
quick to point out, quoting Winston
Churchill's statement during L1w
1954~1955 crisis: "A war to kecp the
coastal islands for Chiang would not bc
dcfensible" in Brit:lin.3'2 Eisenhower
also noted in his mcmoirs: "The usc of
evcn small atomic bombs could scarcely
fail to rcsult, for a while, in a worldwide
fceling of revulsion against the United
States, a feeling which might be lesscncd
if these relatively small weapons were
uscd solely against military installations
minimizing fallout and civilian casual ties. ,,3 3
From thc foregoing it is rcasonable
to conclude that, on thc nuclear issuc,
the President is rcsponsive to many
pressurcs from Illany quarters: Congr(!ss,
pllblic opinion, ollr allies, and diffl'fl'nt
VOil'I':; withill thl' admini::tratilln. III' l'ari
undouhtl'dly 1.1\' inllul'lIl'l'd ill his de('ision, bllt tlHlt is not the same as
controlling it. HI! may havc less than
perfcct frcedom because of these pressures, but they by no mealls pre(!lIIpt his
authority. lit! will always havl! two
options: to usc or not to IISC nudear
weapons. In a crisis situation, whcn the
need for sllch weapons is grcatest, he
will havc the ability to choose either
option.
The Influence of Strategy. "Thc
atLraetiveness of limited war as an alternativc to total war," Brodic has writLcn,
"starts from the fact that as a mallcr of
national policy we have conclusively
forsworn prevcntive war. ,,34 This polic:y
may be questioncd by somc of our more
extrcme "hawks," hut we should ('onsitkr briefly the l'Ollllllcnt of Gellt'ral
Ridgway on tlw cffieaey of the bOlllh as
a tool of war on the Asian Continent:

On this enorlllous land mass
true victory in war could only be
ohtaincd by ddeating thl! cnemy's
armed forces, d('stroying his hope
for victory and his will to resist,
and establishing control ovcr his
land and people. Mass destruction
of his' industrial resources is only
one way to ncutralize his capacity
to wage war. Sueh destruction
may not destroy his will to resist;
it may strengthen his determination. It may have but little
effect initially on his forces in the
field. It estahlishes no ultimate
control over his land.
Furthermore, to my mind,
such mass destruction is repugnant to thc ideals of a Christian
nation. It is incompatiblc with the
basic aim of the free world in war
which is to win a just and lasting
peace. Lasting peace can only be
won by changing the defeatcd
i1gl!ressor into a constructive memlwr of the s(WieLy of fn'e
lIal ion::.:\ 5
It i:: to be hoped that tlw::l! fl~dings
arc shared not only Ly our own natiollal
leaders, but also hy the national leaders
of our opponcnls. If thl! ('IWIlIY first
re~orts to the use of 1IIIt:l(~m· w(:aponH,
our option to refrain from silllilnr lI:;e is
almost certainly foreclosed. It is inconeeivablc to this writer that any President
could resist the imperative to retaliate.
Several circumstances might encourage a President to consider the use
of nuclear weapons when his own beller
judgment dictated otherwisc. Any man
faeed with f(':;ponsibility for a largeseall! local defeat, a loss of "face,"
prestige, natiomll honor, and the liv~s of
"American boys" may well conclude
tlwt the attendant risks of esc:llation arc
now les.'i illlportant. This situalion is not
without historieal pr(!(:edenl. I II late
1950 Auwriean troops in Kon:<1 were
threatencd with expulsion from the

510
peninsula unless reinforcements soon
arrived to bolster their defenses or a
political settlement could be achieved
with the North Koreans. Here the demands of military necessity could have
forcefully argued for the usc of nuclear
weapons. A Pusan evacuation might
have ended a disastrous campaign. Yet
the extremity of that situation stiII did
not guarantee that nuclear authorization
would be forthcoming.
\V e may not necessarily be correct in
assuming the enemy will again rceklessly
push us to the wall in the future. I II this
regard we must heed the example or
President Kennedy who, in the events of
October 1962, cautioned: "\Ve don't
want to push [Khrushchev] to a preeipitous action-give him time to (:on~ider. I
don't want to put him in a corner from
which he cannot escape. ,,3 6 Likewise,
the "initocr!lts of Soviet Russia and Cuba
may have learned an important lesson
from the same experience. As Schelling
has pointed out, they may have come to
realize, in the wake of their underestimation of the U.S. reaction to the
crisis, that "however peaceable the President may want to he, there were
political limits to his patience. ,,37
Another common reason favorinj!; the
Uf;e of tactical nuclear wcapons is tlwir
"cost effectiveness." By now tlH~ priee
of nudear weapons is less than the cost
of high cxplosivc weapons of equivalent
yiekl and effectiveness. 3 8 l\lore re\(:v,mt
is the fact that tens of thousands of
tactical nuclear devices are already
"paid for" and stockpiled. American
gencrals have c1aimcd that this reason
alonc dictates the use of such ceonolllical means. 3 9 Any such urging ignores
the considerations of the increased costs
in human and material rcsoun:es resulting from the higher levels of destruction obtninable throuj!;h nuclear warfare.
The :tvaihtbility of the dleap 1I11d(~ar
weapons to mall)' slaks af{!;UCS a{!;aillst a
cOl't-dfeel i\'e nue\ear strategy.
Thefe is no question of the nec,~ssity
for tactical nue\ear weapons in our

arsenal. They wiII always serve, just as
our strategic ICBM's do, as deterrents to
blackmail by any nuclear-armed enemy.
They have been and are being used to
physicalIy define our most vital interests
in Europe. They will always provide the
nuclear umbrella under which we elln
meet limited :Iggressions with conventional force.
There lire many valid reasons for
refraining from the first usc of nuclellr
weapons. Perhaps the most obvious
hrake is acknowledgment that "the
moment we st:trt visualizing them being
used reciproeaIly, their usc ecasl~s to
look overwhelmingly advantageous to
us. ,,40 Nuclear capabilities may proliferate, and it iR not inconeeiv:thle that
nudear arllls will someday bl~ Iluuh:
available to many smaller states. In
these circumstances it would be unwise
to "break the icc" by employing nuclear
weapons for a nonvital purpose.
In The Year 2000, Herman Kahn
contends that as many as 50 countries
may have access to nuclear weapons. 41
Long hefore that· time the Chinese
People's Republic will d('vclop and
hmndish taclie:tlnuclear weapons. Their
hehavior with respect to their small
lIeighhors 011 the "rim of Asia" will he
in part conditioned by the previous
p(~rrormance of otlu:r nud(~ar POW(!r/;.
An ohl'Crvation of "Im:al wars" in Iii·
c:ttes tll:lt fan:ttical local leaders often
life d(:termined tl) achieve their own
political goals with liLLie regard for the
controls and :Igreements of the Great
Powers. The very obvious conclusion is
thal "indigenous self-restraint cannot
:tlw:tys be counted on to k(:e!, local
confliets either local or limiled.'i42 The
dangers that will accrue when and if
these leaders possess crude nuclear
weapons arc obvious.
Also restraining the President is thr.
tradilion of nonn:;e whidl has grown
and is ~rowing. l~lIdl y(~ar Ilw "fin',
break" bctwcl'J\ l~onventiOlt:\1 :11111
nuclear we:tpons becomes morro difficult
to cross. One proponcnt of thc
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"firebreak" theory, Thomas Schelling,
mainLains that upon the first use of
nudmlrs the participants will have
moved out of the realm of the "Lactical" into the highest levels of strategic
bargaining. 4 3 He cautions:
This is not an event to be squandered on an unworthy miliLary
objeeLive. The first nuclear detonation can convey a message of
utmost seriousness; it may be a
unique lIleans of ("ollllllllllieation
in a mOlllenL of IIIl1lsual gravity.
To dcgradl: the signal in advance,
Lo depreciate the currency, to
erode gradually a tradition that
might somedHY be shaLlered with
diplomatic effect, Lo vulgarize
weapons that have acquired a
transcendent status, and to demote nuclear weapons to the
staLus of merely efficient artillery,
may be to waste an enormous
assct of last resort. 44
The restrictive faeLors listed above
would seelll to weigh more heavily on
tIm President than the factors whieh
encourage tactical nuclear warfare. The
l!apital investment and cost-effectiveness
argumen ts have beell set aside in hoth
major limited wars in whidl we hHve
belm engaged, as w!!ll as in lIumerous
lesser engagements. During this time,
the uuclear capabilities of both the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China have grown. Now the hazards
of engaging the proxies of these two
Communist powers in a bipolar nuclear
confrontation arc increased. If the
reasons for avoiding the usc of nuclear
weapons were compelling in the past,
they are, therefore, even more compdling now.
Past Presidential Decisions. Stratqric
planners have voil'ed I:OI1('ern over Ihe
question of whether politil'al leaders
would have the nl:ees,';ary wiII ,md determination to usc nudear weapons in

situations where they were required.
One man who confounds such blanket
indietments is Harry Truman. With no
well-defined nuclear strategy to consult
and little time for reflection on the
subject, he made the decision to drop
atomic weapons on two Japanese cities.
Yet, when American troops were committed to combat in Korea, the same
man used the utmost restraint even
when his forces were being badly
beaten.
In critieizing the theory of "massive
rd,llialion," CelH:ral Taylor revi,:ws this
d;'cision, noting thai, even though the
United States had a virtual monopoly of
nuelear weapons, "for reasons sufficient
un to our responsiblt: leaders at the
time," the United States chose Lo fight a
limited war for limited objectives. He
also commented that "this was, and still
is, a hard fact for many military polemists to swallow. ,>45
Among them was Lt. Gen. James M.
Gavin, who wrote in retirement:
... when the Korean situation
hroke and the prospects of thl:
defeat of the Sth Army were real
and compelling, General Nichols
and I ... urged ... that we usc
uuclear weapons against the North
Korean I·'on:,:s. II woul,1 IllIve
heen militarily ilH:xeusahll! 10
ullow the 8th Army to he destroyed without even using the
most powerful weapons in our
arsenal. Yet we almost did so! ...
The situation in the summer of
1950 offered us a number of well
worthwhile tactical nuclcar targets
if we had the moral courage to
make the decision to usc them. 4 6
Harry Truman had ccrtainly demonstrated the rcquisite "moral courage" in
the P'lst. And in a careful mwlysis of thc
Korean ea:;l" Ikrnanl Brndi,' ,IoeumelliI'd four good re,l:mns why Truman
dedincd their use this time. Tlwy wert::
(I) the JoinL Chiefs of Staff and civilian
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policymakcrs helieved that Lhc Korean
war wa~ a feillt hy thc Sovicts for the
prin<:ipal threaL whieh woul,) eome later
in Europe; (2) loeal Ail' Force eOIl1mallders reported thaL then: were 110
slIiLable targeLs for aLomic weapons ill
Korea; (3) our allie8 werc sLrongly
opposed to Lhe USI: of aLomie weapons
in Korl'<I; and (,t.) we al~o feared Lhe
retaliation of Lhe Soviets, wiLh their
~mall sLoek of :ILolllie we,!}JOns, againsL
Pusan or tar~elS in .I apan, 4
When we consider thc puhlie sentiIIIcn L in favor of thc "old soldil~r,"
filaeArthur, it mip;ht he said LhaL the
Man from Independencc earned that
title and demom:trated greater moral
courage by desisting from Lhe lH;t~ of the
atomic bomb in Korea, The full measure
of his fortiLude can only be appreciaLed
when one con~idcrs Lhe re~LrainL Lhe
administration was conLell1l'latinp;, Gencral Collins wriLes of the concern of Lhe
British in the conference of Deeernber
1950, previously referred to, and tlw
n~sul tin~ ap;reement:
In the filial eondusions of thl'
eouferces it \\lIS up:reed that a
cease-fire Ullt! pcacd'ul solutioll of
the eOllfliel were de5iruble ill tlw
immediaLe flltllre, if Lhey could he
st~eurcd Oil honorahle tt:rlll5, Ilowever, such a solution would noL he
burtered wiLh the Chine8e COIIIlIlunists ill excll:lllp;e for our withdrawing proLeetion from Formosa
or Illdo-Chinu, If no solu Lion
could be obtuined, the Amerieun
ulld British troops would fight on
in Koreu unlcs,~ they were forced
out. The Secretary of Stutl' so
in f ormcd Cent'ral I\IaeArthur.
(~:mphasis udded)48
In tht' rUlllou~ pre~s stut,'nu'nt whi('h
prolliptt'" lilt' ulli"tI ':Olll't'I'I'IU"', Trllillan
h;ul hillll'd Ilwl, now Ihal lIlt' COIIIIIIUni,:t Chin"H' WI'I'I' in tIlt' l\.ort'an \Iar, he
mip;ht use IIl1dear weapons. In Ihe uproar tlwt !'ollowetl, the White Iiouse

released a second sLuLemenL designed Lo
correct Lhe siLuution: " •.• by law, only
the President ean authoril'.(: 'the USt: of
the uLom bomb und no such au Lhoril'.aLion hus been given.,>4 9
President 'l'rumun had revealed his
attitude toward nuclear weapons in
previous sLaLcmcn Ls. "Y ou have to
lIIulersLand thaL this isn't u military
weapon" Iw said firmly, "so we have got
10 twaL this differenLly from rifles and
cannon, ... "50
PresidenL Eislmhower, on the other
hand, has been held up as an adhcrenL
to the philosophy thaL nur.l(!ar weapons
ough L to be used like artillery, on tIll:
basis of effieieney.51 Some would
dOllht, how,wt'r, thaL Lhese wcre his trill:
fl'c1ings und eitt: his willingncss to negotiate thc suspension of nuclear testing as
clear evidenc(: that he was influenced by
the psychol!>gieal and symbolic status of
nucleur weapons. 5 2
BuL iL was in Lhis basic difference of
real or posed, LhaL the nuclear
iS~lIe first ht~t:anw a politit'al footlHlII in
Ihe 1952 d"t:tion. Prior to tIll! Rel'lIhliean Convenlion, Ikl' had St't'n no ('as),
way to end Ihe war. On 5 .I111l(! he
dt'dan~d: "I do not bdi,'vt' that in till! .
presenL sillHltion there is any' c1ean·cuL
unswer Lo hringing the Korean \V ar to a
~1I(:e,~~sl'lIl eondu~ion,,,5 J Two w,'eks
lalt'r, when nu:t!ling wilh the delt'gations
from Oregon and Arizona, he refused to
advocate esealaLion of the war. He
warned the delegates that seeking a
miliLary vit:Lory on LIII: peninsula would
mcan risking a gencral war. 54 In thus
staLing his posiLion, General Eisenhower
hroke publicly wiLh tlw MaeArthur-Taft
strategy and thaL wing of the Republican Party which had heen bcrating the
J)'!lIlocraLie administration's limited war
philosophy.55
Y1'1 wht'n III' h"(',IIIW Pn'sid"III, I k,,'s
Ihrl'al 10 witl,'n Ih,' war mltl u:-;,' II 10111 it,
1\I';I\,on:-; \1':1:-; t'rt'elilt',1 wilh hdllp: IIII'
1II0si illlportant t'I('III,'nt in illlproving
arillisliee nt'p:otiations. 5 6 I t was this
willingness to threaten LIIl! liSt: of
aL\itudt~s,
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nuclear weapons which also turned the
tide at Quemoy in 1958. After three
nuclear-capable 8-ineh howitzers were
brought ashore on the coastal island, the
Chinese rescinded their test of the will
of the UniLed States.5'7 Likewise in
Korea in 1958, after similar capabilities
were inLroduced there by the U.S.
Army, Chinese Lroops wiLhdrew from
NorLh Korca. 5 8
To point Lo such suecesscs' is noL to
impute recklessness to the EisenhowerDulles game of brinkmanship. While Ike
LhreaLencd the usc of nuclear weapons,
hc was fully aware of the asymmeLry of
his adversary's arsenal. And his oLher
moves demonsLrated a healLhy respect
for thc (:ssenLial diff(!rl!llce beLween
conVl'nLionul and nudeur wenpon~. 1L is
significant that during thc Lebunon
landing in 1958 the U.S. Army had an
Honest John' rocket afloat off Beirut
but was not allowed Lo land it bceause it
could fire an atomic warhead as well as
a convenLional onc. 5 9
In the struggle over Quemoy, Ike und
Dulles had prepared u memo for the
record which considered the opLions
short of tactical nuclear weapons. In
parL, it read:

If the Communists, aeLing on the
supposiLion Lhat wc will not
aeLivdy inLervene, sel~k to take
Quemoy by assauIL ... then:
might be a period between Lhe
beginning of assault and irrevocable commitment whcn prompt
and subsLanLial U.S. inLervention
with conventional weapons might
lead the Chieoms Lo withhold or
rcverse thcir aS5uult effort. OLherwise our inLervention would
probably not be effecLive if it
were limited to the usc of conventionnl weapons. 6 0
Further, in eonsirlerinl! tlw dlnlh'np:,~
to Formo:'u hy Chuirmnn l\lnll in IIII'
latl' sUJllmer of 19!iB, I ke noted the
change of circumstances since Lhe
previous threaLs of 1955.

For one thing, the Soviets had
used the intervening years to build
up their nuclear strike force,
which now included a more formidable arsenal of hydrogen
weapons. I did not doubt our
total superiority, but any largescale conflict stimulated here was
now less likely Lo remain limiLed
to a conventional use of power. 61
] f the Eisenhower administration had
learned that nuclear weapons could he
purchased wiLh rubles as well as dollars,
suhsequcnt Presidents would have to
acknowledge in their strategies that they
also can be purchased for francs, yen,
and undoubtedly many other eurrenci($.
The distinctive philosophy of the
Eisenhower years was first introduced
by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles when he used the term "massive
retaliation" in a speech before the
Council of Foreign Relations in January
]951),.62

Dulles emphasized that the policy
was a new one, resulting from some
hasic policy decisions made hy the
National Security Council. "The basic
'd eelSlon,
.. " I Ie sal(,
'1" was to I Jepl:IHJ
primarily upon a great capacity to reLaliall:, insL:lJltly, and hy nwans and nl
"I:\(:es of our own 'ello()~ing." 'I'It(:
benefit was to be "more hasic security
at less cost. ,>6 3'
.
This philosophy was to come under
lire from an Army man, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, in his writings published between his term as Army Chief of Staff
for Eisenhower and later service as
Chairman of the J oint Chiefs for Kennedy. But the first official and public
break in the application of this philosoph)' came from within the ranks of the
aelive-service military serving the Eisenhower arllllinistrnlion. On 12 NoV!'mlll:r
19!i7. in CiIH'innnli, Ohio, (:I'nl'rnl
Lnuris Nor:;tud, thl'n Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe,
delivered a speech in which he stated:
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"If ... we have means to meet less-thanultimate threats with a decisive, but
less-than-ultimate response, the very
possession of this ability would discourage the threat, and would thereby
provide us with essential ~olitieal and
military maneuverability. "6
This was not then called the "strategy of flexible response," but it did
include the basic philosophy of a paper
entitled "A National Military Program"
which General Taylor had prepared for
the JCS in 1956.65 This strategy was to
become the hallmark of the Kennedy!
McNamara years.
Before he took office, President Kennedy had read and was impressed by
Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet.
He had campaigned on the so-called
"missile gap," and once in office he
initiated a review of U.S. and Soviet
ICBM capabilities. Before the results of
this survey were known, JFK, in four
separate passages of his first defense
message to Congress on 28 March ] 961 ,
renounced any intention to exerei~e a
first-strike option. 6 6 I t was a !'peeeh
intended as Illueh for Bus:;iall ear!' a:-;
any others. And it, like future poliey
statements and actions, was ealeulah'd
to remove much of the instability of the
nuclear arms race.
On tactical nuclear welll'0ns the mt:~
sage was clear. Maxwell Taylor's outlook had been clearly stated in his
proposed "New National Military Program." "The question of using atomic
weapons in limited wars would be met
by accepting the fact that primary
dependence must be placed on conventional weapons while retaining readiness
to use tactical atomic weapons in the
comparatively rllre cases where their u!','
would be to our national intercst.'>6 7
The same attitudes were pervm~ive in
the D(,fense E:-;Iablishment. Depllly
S""rdar), Boswell (; ilpalri(: ~li(1 Oil ()
.11111(' IlJh I Ihlll Ill', for one, ha,1 "III'\'l'r
believed in a so·called limited llul'lear
war. I just don't know," he con tinued,
"how you build a limit into it on!:e you

start using any kind of nuclear bang.,,6 8
And there was concern in Defense
that we might not h~ve adequate conventional defense to refrain from using
nuclear weapons when we would have
preferred to limit our response to aggression. "The decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons," testified Secretary McNamara before the House
Armed Services Committee in January
1963, "should not be forced upon us
simply because we have no other way to
cope with a particular situation.,,6 9
Another "defense intellectual," Alain
Enthoven, stressed the same view in a
major statement later the same year:
We will have no sensible alternalive to building lip our conventional forces to the point at which
they can safely resist all forms of
non-nuclear aggression. Our forces
will be adcquate if we can never
be forced because of weakness to
be the first to have to resort to
nuclear weapons. 7 0
A fler Ieavillg II\(~ Dd"II!'!' )}('parlmellt in 19MI, I\kNmllara r(!(~lIl1('(I:
... strategic nuclear forces in
tllt!nu;t:\vl!s no longer eonsl i tu ted :t
ert:tlible tlelerrt'llt 10 11u: hrolld
range of aggression, if indecd they
ever had in the past. ... we could
not substitute tactical nuclear
weapons for conven tional forccs
in the types of conflicts that were
most likely to involve us in the
period of the 1960s.
WI' agreed, of COllrse, that an
effeeth'e taclil'al nudl,:tr capahility was eS!'l'nlial to our ov(:r-lIl1
strategy. But we also felL very
strongly LhllL Ihe decision to en!ploy slH'h 1I111'1.'ar w,'apolI:l shollld
1101 hI' fort,(,tI IIpOIl II~ ~illlply
because we had 110 oLher meallS to
cope with COllnict. We recognized
Lhell whaL has become so obvious
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When fael:d wiLh the tough deei~jon,
President Kennedy was not at all inclined Lo usc the nuclear weapon except
in dire circumstances. In 196 I, when
considering inLervention in Laos, the
qucsLion of the possihle alternatives for
rescuing a contingent Lrapped in the
landlocked counLry was rais(:c!. The
'n'~IH)lJge from the miliLary was Lhat
Hanoi would have to be desLroyed,
probably using nuclear weapons. P"resident Kenncdy opted for diplomatic
measures. 72 Again, during thc Cuban
missile crisis, a member of thc join t
Chiefs argued that the United SLates
could usc nuclear weapons on the hasis
that our adversaries would use Lheirs
againsL us in an attack. To Lhis Bobby
Kcnnedy would comment: "f Lhought,
as I lisLened, of the many times that I
had hcard the military takl: pO!'itions
which, if wrong, had the advantagc that
no one would be around at the end to
k now. ,,73 T he diplomatic-military
combination was used instead.
The johnson administration eonLinued in the same nuclear strall:gy. In
opening his campaign on Labor Day,
I 96t!., Ll3j criticized his opponent by
implication in the most important clement of his speech:

eri tieized Senator (;oldwatel'
throughout the I 96t!. campaign, repeating his theml: on lhis most sensitive
subject. . He obviously subscribed to the
theory of a nuclear firebreak when he
added laler in Llw l:all1paigll: "1,1!l no
one Lhink aLomie weapons arc simply
bigger and more desLructive than other
,,75
weapons....
Seeretary of State Rusk reiterated
Lhe adminislration's fear of nucle.tr escalation when he commented that once
you introduce lIudear wI:apons for tactical purposes, "you hegill to movc
pWlllplly allrl vl'ry fast inlo a general
nuclear exehange.,,7 6
I,'or 20 YI!ars, theil, the United States
It:ls ruled out of its options the use of
nuclear weapons, save Lo protect those
nations the loss of which would drastically revise the world balance of
power.
The eonLinuing Lradition of nonuse
of nuclear weapons in limited war,
which we have traced above, is widening
the nuclear "firebreak" each year. And
Lhere arc no signs at present which
would indieale ilny adlllinisirnlion in
Lhe ncar future would resort lo nudear
weapons to guarantee "vic Lory" in such
a war. While there may be subtle or
overt hrnlldishmenLs of nuclear arm a1II1:IILs in ddinition' of our most vilal
fronLiers with militant CommunisLs,
even there the circumstances and Liming
of their cmployment remain suhject Lo
serious debate.

• . . Makc no mistakc, therc is
no such thing as a conventional
nuclear wcapon. For 19 perilfilled years no nation has loosed
the atom against anothcr. To do
so now is a political decision of
the highest order, and it would
lead us down .111 uncerLain palh of
blows and counlerblows who:::e
oul('ollle none lIIay know. No
I!resident of the Uniled Slales can
divest himself of the responsibility
for such a decision. 74

Conclusions. The American political
process has been described as a struggle
beLween dusters cutting across governmenLal structure, political parties, and
inLerest groups and forming and reforming around various causes or specific
proposals. 77 The decision for lise or
nonuSI: of nudeilr weil(lons in limiled
Will' is flllly ex p()~,~d 10 Ihis (In)("e~s.
\rlll,·,·d it is, atlll shoulll Iw, primarily iI
polilieal deeit'ioll. The "mililary neecs·
sity" for nuclear weapons in limited
con f1ieLs has been and will be seeondilry

now, Lhat Lhere would inev!Lably
be many situations in which it
would be neither feasible nor advisable to usc tactical nuclear
weapons.7 1
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in imporLance Lo many overriding eonsideraLions of domesLie and inLernaLional poliLies, as well as oLher eonsideraLions of our overallnaLional sLraLegy.
BuL as imporLanL as LIII! inlluenees of
Lhe domesLie poliLieal scene and Lhe
opinions of our allies and friends may
he, Lhey can be eonLrolled or overrulc'd
hy a sLrong PresidenL eonvinl'ed of Lhe
necessiLy for employmenL of LaeLieal
nuclear weapons.
Our nuclear sLraLegy, howevc!r, is
eondiLioned by man)' fadors noL as
easily manipulated in Lhe exeeutive
hrandl of ollr GovernmenL. The growing
eapabiliLies of our encmies, the known
weaknesscs of oLher free naLions, Lhe
potl'nLialiLies of Lhe ycL undeveloped
nudear arsenals of medium and minor
powers-all Lhese clements musL be
weighed carefully by a PresidenL ahouL
Lo reic!ase authority for Lhe employmenL
of nudear weapons. Thc!y ,111 Lend Lo
diseourage his seleeLion of Lhe nudear
opLion.
The historieal pre!ee'denLs and adviee
of five PresidC'nt~ will IIndouhl!!clly have
substantial influC'ncl' on tlw dc'c:i:,ion:' of
[uture! Pre'~idc!nt~. Thc'ir rc'slraint oYc'r
tlw lasl 25 ),c!ars will make it more!
diffieulL for any SIIl'ees.'.;or Lo ehoosc!
nudear weapons as a means of gaining
our oiJjeeLivc:s in limilc'c1 war.
The impaeL of all these faeLors, foreign and domes Lie, on Lhis deeisionmaking proeess musL he undersLood lIy
our miliLary leaders. AL leasL in Lhe
higher levels of command, our generals
and admirals musL know undcr just
what eirelllnsLanees Lhey can c!x pc!eL Lo
be permiLLccl the usc' of nudear wc'apons. The case for Lhis clear definiLion
wu~ made hy MorL Hulperin uL Lhe Lime
of Lhe Berlin crisis in 19()j.
I f we do inLend Lo rulc! ouL the USC!
of taC'tieal IIIwit'ar wC',lpons in

C'e'rtain situations. wc' 'We'd to
make that l'lear 10 the mililary
long before the lime arisc's wllC';'
Lhe nuclc!ar weapons mighL hc!
used. The miliL"ry needs Lo undersLand Lhe kinds of pressures whieh
Lhe civilian Icaders musL Lake in Lo
eonsidcraLion in deLerminin the
proper role of miliLary foree. 8

9

The inLelligenL formulaLion and effective exeeuLion of our worldwide sLraLegy depend on mu Lual undersLanding of
our nuclear intenLions by boLh miliLary
and civilian leaders.
RealizaLion of all these faeLs of poliLies and wur docs noL, however, c!xdude
LIH! effeeLivI: lISI! of Pre$iclc!n Lial jnclgmenL on Lhe elllploymenL of ladic'al
nuelear weapons. As long as we relllain
within Lhe conLexL of limiLed war, the
foreseeable eireulIlsLances which coulll
compel the Pre~idenL Lo auLhorize LIII!
firsL usc of nuclear weapons arc very
difficulL Lo projc:cL. Evc:n the possibiliLy
of defeuL in limiLed w.ar would noL sway
a sLrong PresidenL iT he felL oLher fueLors
recommended ahsLenLion raLher Lhan
employmenL. Tlw clamor ami cries at
home mighL be f'Lronger Lhan LllOsr. in
tlte i\laeArLhur episode. BuL the requireIIlI'nt~ o[ our nalional Slralc'/!y ancl
eon."idc!f:ltions of inlc'rnal ional Jlolilil'~
would sustain a Pn:~idc:nL eonvineecl o[
Lhe corrl'cLllI!ss of his decision.
On ~he oLher hand, when Llw sLakes
,Ire raisc!d, wlwn tlu: threat is I'c~cld"ilH~c1
as u reriolls and lInfavoruble readjusLmenL of Lhe world balunce of power,
only overriding clemen Is of our worldwide sLrategie posture could resLrain Lhe
President from employi~'g taeLical nuclear weapons. Such a Lhreat could grow
out of a war begun as a local aggression
employing only conventional weapons.
It might well end with the first nuclear
deLonution in combaL since Nagasaki.
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